1. DEPARTURE:
No pleading
shall except by way of amendment, raise any new ground to claim or contain
any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleading of the party
pleading the same.
The plaintiff
may, with the leave of the Court, tender a written statement, and the defendant
may also with like leave, tender an additional written statement. The rule
requires that in the subsequent statement no pleading should be taken which is
inconsistent with the previous pleading. If at all this can be done it is only
by way of the amendment which shall also require the permission of the Court. Similarly, inconsistent pleas should also not be taken in one the same statement.
2. DENIAL OF CONTRACT:
Where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract
alleged, or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied, and not
as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in the law of such contract.
All matters
which show that the contract is void or unlawful must be specifically pleaded. If
such matters are not specifically pleaded, a bare denial of the contract shall
be taken to mean only that there was in fact no such agreement as alleged; it
will not be construed as a denial of the legality of the contract.
3. EFFECT OF DOCUMENT TO BE STATED:
Wherever the
contents of any document are material, it shall be sufficient in any pleading
to state the effect thereof as briefly as possible, without setting out the
whole or any part thereof, unless the precise words of that document, or part
thereof, are material.
It will be
sufficient, for instance, if a plaintiff in a suit for the recovery of
immovable property under a will states in his plaint the effect of the will
under which he claims. He is not bound to set out the precise words of the
will. It will not, however, be enough for the plaintiff to say that by virtue
of a certain deed he is entitled to the property claimed. He must state the
effect of the document on which he relies.
4. MALICE, KNOWLEDGE, ETC.:
Wherever it is
material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition
of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact
without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.
5. NOTICE:
Wherever it
is material to allege notice to any person of any fact, matter, or thing, it
shall be sufficient to allege such notice as a fact. Unless the form or the
precise terms of such notice, or the circumstances from which such notice is to
be inferred, are material.
Where giving
of notice is merely the performance of a condition precedent it need not be
pleaded by the plaintiff, but where it forms part of the cause of action it
must be pleaded as a fact, e.g., a notice of suit proposed to be brought against
the Government, which is an absolute requirement of law under S.80 of the Civil
Procedure Code.